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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-VENUE-USE OF STATE NONRESIDENT MOTORIST
STATUTE To IMPLY WAIVER-An Illinois corporation brought suit based on
diversity of citizenship in a United States district court in Kentucky against
a resident of Indiana, alleging a cause of action arising from a collision which
occurred on a Kentucky highway. Plaintiff secured personal jurisdiction over
defendant by serving process upon the Secretary of State of Kentucky who
in tum gave notice to the defendant in accordance with the Kentucky nonresident motorist statute.1 Defendant entered a special appearance and moved
that the case be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.2 The motion
was overruled and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.3 On
certiorari the United States Supreme Court held, reversed, Justices Reed
and Minton dissenting. Implied appointment of an agent for service of
process under a nonresident motorist statute does not waive the privilege of
venue conferred by federal statute. Olberding 11. Illinois Central R. Co., 346
U.S. 338, 74 S.Ct. 83 (1953).
Since the Supreme Court's approval of a state nonresident motorist statute
in 1927,4 all of the states and the District of Columbia have enacted substantially similar statutes,5 which prescribe, essentially, that the use of state
highways by a nonresident motorist shall be deemed the equivalent of an
appointment of a designated state official as agent of the nonresident to accept
service of process in any action growing out of such use of the highways. 6

1 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§188.020, 188.030. The Kentucky statute in substance
provides that a nonresident motorist who operates his automobile on the state's highways
makes the secretary of state his agent for service of process in any civil action arising out
of such operation. There is also specified a procedure for serving summons on the secretary
of state, who in tum is to notify the nonresident defendant by registered mail.
228 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l391(a).
a Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., (6th Cir. 1953) 201 F. (2d) 582.
4 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927).
5 For a listing of these statutes, see Knoop v. Anderson, (D.C. Iowa 1947) 71 F. Supp.
832.
6 See Culp, ''Process in Actions against Non-Resident Motorists," 32 MrcH. L. RBv.
325 (1934); Culp, ''Recent Developments in Actions against Nonresident Motorists," 37
MrCH. L. RBv. 58 (1938); Scott, "Hess and Pawloski Carry On," 64 HARv. L. RBv. 98
(1950); Scott, "Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists," 39 HARv. L. RBv. 563 (192?)·
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These statutes provide a method for acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant
in the state in which the cause of action accrued. Although the extent of
their application depends upon the specific terms of each statute, it has been
held that they may operate for the benefit of nonresident plaintiffs,7 and may
apply equally to defendants who are residents of other states8 and those who
are residents of other countries.9 Furthermore, service of process under authority of these statutes confers personal jurisdiction in federal courts within
the state as well as in state tribunals.10 A venue problem arises, however,
when both plaintiff and defendant in a federal court are nonresidents of the
district in which a diversity suit is filed. Section 139l(a) of the Judicial Code
requires that cases in which jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship
be brought in the "judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants
reside."11 Though not a qualification upon the power of the court to adjudicate, the venue provision is a limitation designed for the convenience of
litigants. Therefore, unless this requirement is waived, an objecting defendant
should be granted a dismissal, or a transfer to a district where venue is proper.12
It was the attempt to predicate an implied waiver of the venue privilege on
provisions of the nonresident motorist statute that led to the procedural issue
in the principal case. Extending the doctrine announced by the Supreme
Court in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd.,13 which held
that when a foreign corporation appoints a resident agent to accept service
of process in a state in which it is doing business such appointment amounts
to a waiver of the federal venue privilege, the district courts almost consistently
ruled that the implied appointment of an agent for service of process by
driving on state highways is likewise a waiver of federal venue.14 Although
waiver of venue is commonly found in "submission through conduct,"15 these
decisions go one step further in equating the agency which is created by
implied appointment under the nonresident motorist statutes to the agency
created by formal appointment by a foreign corporation.16 The rationale of
1 Neff v. Hindman, (D.C. Pa. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 4.
8 See Peeples v. Ramspacher, (D.C. S.C. 1939) 29 F.
9 Lulevitch v. Hill, (D.C. Pa. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 612.

Supp. 632.

lORule 4(d)(7), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. (1946).
1128 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l39l(a).
1228 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l406(a): ''The district court of a district in which
is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the
interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought."
·
1s 308 U.S. 165, 60 S.Ct. 153 (1939). In 1948, revised 28 U.S.C. §l39l(c) adopted
the doctrine of the Neirbo case by enlarging venue possibilities as to corporate defendants.
14 Falter v. Southwest Wheel Co., (D.C. Pa. 1953) 109 F. Supp. 556; Archambeau
v. Emerson, (D.C. Mich. 1952) 108 F. Supp. 28; Jacobson v. Schuman, (D.C. Vt. 1952)
105 F. Supp. 483. Contra, Waters v. Plybom, (D.C. Tenn. 1950) 93 F. Supp. 651.
15 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., note 13 supra, at 168.
16 For an extension of the Neirbo waiver theory as applied to corporations, see Knott
Corp. v. Furman, (4th Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 199, cert. den. 332 U.S. 809, 68 S. Ct. Ill
(1947), which held that jurisdiction exercised by a state over a foreign corporation doing
business within its boundaries is based on an implied consent and that consequently the
corporation waives its federal venue privilege by doing business in the state. The failure
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these cases seems to be that the very fact of agency rather than the manner
of appointment constitutes the waiver. The conllict of opinion resulting in
the circuit courts17 is resolved by the decision in the principal case in favor
of the nonresident defendant. In considering the underlying theory of the
nonresident motorist statutes, the Court refuses to extend the procedural
device of implied agency beyond the purpose for which it was devised, that
of circumventing the requirement of personal service within the state.18 It
is evident that the conclusion reached does not adversely affect the interests
of the resident plaintiff for whose protection these statutes were enacted. Nor
does the conclusion place undue burden on the nonresident plaintiff, who
retains the privilege of trial in a neutral jurisdiction, either in the state
courts, or, on defendant's motion for removal, in the federal court in the
district in which the action is pending.19 The result of the principal case
preserves the defendant's privilege of venue without impairing the functional
utility of the nonresident motorist statutes.

Raynwnd R. Trombadore, S.Ed.

to distinguish between implied and actual consent led to contrary results in at least three
other circuits: Robinson v. Coos Bay Pulp Corp., (3d Cir. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 512; Moss
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., (2d Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 701; Cummer-Graham Co. v.
Straight Side Basket Corp., (9th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 828. This question was mooted
by the 1948 amendment to the Judicial Code which broadened the venue provisions as to
corporate defendants. See note 13 supra.
17 Martin v. Fishbach Trucking Co., (1st Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 53; Olberding v.
lliinois Central R. Co., (6th Cir. 1953) 201 F. (2d) 582; McCoy v. Siler, (3d Cir. 1953)
205 F. (2d) 498. The First and Third Circuits held no waiver of venue privilege.
18 The Court does conclude, however, that a waiver of venue may be found "in
situations where a state may validly require the designation of an agent for service of
process as a condition of carrying on activities within its borders, and such designation has
in fact been made." Principal case at 342, citing Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37
S.Ct. 30 (1916), which upheld the New Jersey statute requiring the nonresident motorist
formally to designate the secretary of state as agent upon whom process might be served.
1928 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §144l(a).

